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Abstract 
This paper presents a quantitative analysis of the model developed in Galor and Moav, 
Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic Growth (2002), in which agents vary 
genetically in their preference for quality and quantity of children. We simulate a 
parametric form of the model, enabling examination of the transition from Malthusian 
stagnation to modern rates of economic growth. The simulations allow an assessment of 
the strength of the biological foundations of the model and demonstrate the 
susceptibility of the modern high-growth state to invasion by cheaters. Extending the 
model from two to three genotypes suggests the possibility of a return to Malthusian 
conditions rather than a permanent state of modern growth. 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the past thirty years, there has been an increasing scientific interest in using 
evolutionary theory to explain human economic behaviour. Since the advocacy of this 
approach by Becker (1976) and Hirshleifer (1977), Darwinian (1859) thinking has been 
used to explain the evolution of human risk preference (Rubin & Paul II 1979), time 
preference (Hansson & Stuart 1990, Rogers 1994, Robson & Samuelson 2007, Robson 
& Szentes 2008), and the shape of utility functions (Netzer 2009).
1 More recently, 
evolutionary theory has been applied to the emergence of modern economic growth. 
Galor and Moav (2002) developed a unified growth model in which natural selection 
favours traits that affect the economic environment. This model was the first to use 
frequency changes of heritable traits to explain the shift of human populations from 
Malthusian stagnation to modern economic growth. Galor and Moav proposed a gene-
encoded preference for quality or quantity of children, which is similar to r/K selection 
in behavioural ecology. The quantity-quality trade-off has been hypothesised as an 
economic factor by, among others, Becker (1960), and Becker and Lewis (1974). 
Becker et al. (1990) considered the link between the quantity-quality trade-off and 
economic growth.
2 
In the Galor and Moav model, individuals who invest in the education of their children 
have an evolutionary advantage in the early stages of economic development. As 
technological progress depends on human capital and the returns to education increase 
with technological progress, this positive feedback ultimately results in an escape from 
Malthusian stagnation. Galor and Moav noted that natural selection might favour other 
growth promoting traits. For example, Galor and Michalopoulos (2011) suggested that 
entrepreneurial spirit creates an evolutionary advantage in the early stages of economic 
development, while less entrepreneurially spirited individuals do well in mature 
economies. The positive feedback between entrepreneurial spirit and economic 
development lifts the economy out of Malthusian stagnation. 
                                                 
1 Alchian (1950) and Nelson and Winter (1982) applied evolutionary concepts to the theory of firm and 
industrial organization. 
2 Increasing technological progress and variation in heritable preferences underlies the trade-off in the 
Galor and Moav model, while a substitution effect due to higher income drives the trade-off proposed by 
Becker at al. 2 
 
Galore and Moav (2002) investigated the dynamics of their model analytically using 
phase diagrams. In this paper, their model is analysed numerically by simulation. The 
method is similar to the one that Lagerlof (2006) used to simulate the model of Galor 
and Weil (2000).
3 The advantage of simulation is that it allows exploration of a richer 
specification of models for which there exists no closed-form solution. In particular, it 
will be possible to consider more than two genotypes with different preference for 
quality and quantity of children, which may emerge either though migration or 
mutation. This allows a demonstration of the susceptibility of the modern high-growth 
state to invasion by cheaters. The extended model suggests the possibility of a return to 
Malthusian conditions after the modern period of economic growth rather than a 
permanent continuation of growth. 
 
2.  Background 
Besides Galor and Moav (2002), several other authors applied evolutionary theory in 
the analysis of economic growth and the transition from the Malthusian state to modern 
rates of growth. In their seminal paper on the evolution of preferences for saving and 
labour supply, Hansson and Stuart (1990) proposed that human preferences depend on 
the availability of resources. Harsh natural environments select for genotypes that have 
a stronger preference for saving, leading to an equilibrium with low population density 
and high per-capita capital. Selected traits include a preference for work and 
accumulation of physical capital. This might explain why humans left the Malthusian 
state first in regions with harsh winters.  
Clark (2007) suggested that selection for certain heritable characteristics accounted for 
the Industrial Revolution. While open as to whether these traits were transmitted 
genetically or culturally, he found higher reproductive success among wealthy males in 
England between 1250 and 1800.
4 He hypothesised that individuals with favoured traits 
such as a propensity to hard work and saving increased in frequency during this time. 
                                                 
3 The trigger for the take-off in the Galor and Weil (2000) model is increasing technological progress with 
increasing population, while the Galor and Moav (2002) model relies on investment in education by the 
quality-preferring types in the population. 
4 Clark’s proposal followed from work published by Clark and Hamilton (2006) on the reproductive 
success of the wealthy in England. 3 
 
This change in population composition could then have provided the basis for the 
Industrial Revolution. 
The increasing availability of population genetic data, such as Cavalli-Sforza et al. 
(1994), has led to more research. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) linked differences in 
economic development with the genetic distance between populations, which depends 
on the time elapsed since two populations shared a common ancestor. They proposed 
that genetic distance increases income differences because it may act as a barrier to the 
diffusion of technological development between populations. As genetic distance is 
based on neutral genes that are not subject to selection pressure, their hypothesis does 
not rely on any difference in economic traits between populations. Differences in 
income may arise merely by chance and the failure of technological advances to diffuse 
through the genetic distance barrier. 
Recently, Ashraf and Galor (2010) proposed that the geographic distance of a 
population from Africa has affected the level of growth and development across 
regions. They found that populations with elevated or reduced genetic diversity have 
experienced the lowest level of economic development since the Industrial Revolution.
5 
Indigenous populations of the Americas have the lowest level of genetic diversity due to 
the founder effect, whereas Africans have the highest.
6 The hump-shaped relationship 
between genetic diversity and economic development is due to a trade-off between the 
costs and benefits of genetic diversity. A high level of genetic diversity expands the 
production possibilities through complementarities in knowledge production but 
disrupts the diffusion of technology due to lower levels of trust and cooperation 
between dissimilar individuals. 
 
3.  The Galor and Moav model 
Galor and Moav (2002) developed an overlapping generations model, with each agent 
living for two periods (childhood and adulthood). In childhood, agents are passive and 
                                                 
5 Genetic diversity was measured using expected heterozygosity, an index of the probability that two 
individuals, selected at random from the relevant population, are genetically different from one another. 
6 The founder effect is the loss of genetic diversity that occurs when a small subset of a larger population 
establishes a new population. 4 
 
they receive education. During adulthood, agents decide on how much time to dedicate 
to work or childrearing and they choose the number of children and their education. 
Reproduction is asexual by a single parent. 
Production in the economy occurs with inputs of labour, Ht, and a limited resource, X, 
which may be called land. Ht measures the aggregate quantity of efficiency units of 
labour at time t. Aggregate output, Yt, is given by a constant returns to scale technology:  
       
1       
    ∈  0 , 1         ( 1 )  
1-α is the labour share of production. The level of technology, At, is determined 
endogenously in the model. 
Assuming there are no property rights over land, the return to land is zero and the wage 
per efficiency unit of labour, wt, is the output per unit of labour, xt. 
       
          ( 2 )  
where     
   
  
 
The population consists of two genotypes (i = a, b) with different preferences between 
the quality and quantity of their children. The utility function is: 
  
     1    ln  
       l n   
       ln    
        ( 3 )  
   ∈ 0,1 ;					   ∈  0,1 ;     ∈  ,   
where   
  is the consumption of an individual with genotype i in period t,   
  is the 
number of children, and     
   is the level of human capital of each child. The parameter 
γ measures the relative weight of children in the utility function, and the parameter β
i 
determines the weight that a genotype i individual gives to the quality of children. Both 
parameters are inherited without change by the subsequent generations.  
In adulthood, agents have one unit of time that they allocate between childrearing and 
participation in the labour market. Potential income,   
 , is the maximum income that 
could be earned if the agent’s entire time endowment was devoted to labour force 
participation:  
  
        
      
   
         ( 4 )  5 
 
A parent incurs a base time cost, τ, for each child, with an additional time cost to 
educate the child to the level of education     
  .   
          
    is the total cost of raising 
a family with n children and 1    
          
    is the time left for working. Thus, the 
budget constraint faced in adulthood is: 
  
        
   1    
          
          ( 5 )  
Human capital is a function of education and the technological environment. Education 
increases human capital, while technological progress reduces the usefulness of existing 
human capital. The function for human capital and the conditions it must satisfy are as 
follows: 
    
            
  ,                        ≡                 ⁄    (6) 
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Human capital increases at a diminishing rate with education (    
  ), it is eroded at a 
decreasing rate by technological progress (gt+1), and technological progress strengthens 
the effect of education on human capital. Human capital is normalised to one in the 
absence of education and technological progress. 
Substituting equations (5) and (6) into equation (3), a genotype i parent of generation t 
faces the following optimisation problem: 
   
 ,     
                   1   ln    
  1     
          
         (7) 
     ln  
       ln      
  ,         
subject to income being enough to meet the subsistence level of consumption  ̃. 
    
  1     
          
        ̃       ( 8 )  
   
 ,     
    0  6 
 
The fertility of a genotype i individual varies across three scenarios: where the 
subsistence constraint does not bind, where it binds, and where potential income is 
insufficient to meet the subsistence level of consumption. Taking the first order 
condition of equation (7) with respect to   
  gives fertility when the constraint does not 
bind; solving equation (8) as an equality gives fertility where the constraint binds; and 
no children are born when the parent is reduced to the subsistence level of consumption. 
These three scenarios are shown in equation (9): 
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  								  	 ̃     
     ̃
0																				  	  
     ̃
      ( 9 )  
where  ̃ ≡
   
 1    
The number of children depends positively on potential income and negatively on the 
time cost of childrearing. Above the critical value  ̃, only the time costs of childrearing 
matter. No children are born when the parent is reduced to the subsistence level of 
consumption. 
Taking the first-order condition of equation (7) with respect to the second choice 
variable et+1 gives: 
         
  ,       
     1
  ,   1 
      1
    	 
 0 	     	   0
 0 	     	   0      (10) 
The first term represents the utility benefit of a marginal increase in investment in the 
quality of children. The utility benefit of education depends positively on the partial 
derivative of the human capital function he and the weight given to the quality of 
children in the utility function . The second term is the utility benefit of a marginal 
increase in investment in the quantity of children. Optimal behaviour requires that the 
marginal benefit of education equals the marginal benefit of additional children if the 
parent chooses a positive level of education.  
The following condition ensures that the level of education is positive for those with the 
highest valuation for quality (
i = 1) when technological progress is zero:  
   0,0   
1
          ( 1 1 )  7 
 
If equation (11) is not satisfied, no agents will educate their children, leading to a 
permanent Malthusian state. 
The average level of education in the population, et, is: 
         
     1       
        ( 1 2 )  




      





qt indicates the proportion of genotype a in the population, with   
  and   
 	the number of 
genotype a and b individuals and Lt the total population. It is assumed that technological 
progress, gt+1, which determines economic growth, is an increasing and concave 
function of the average level of education: 
     ≡                 ⁄                  (13) 
    0 ;        0 ;    0   0  
Finally, the following steps yield the aggregate labour supply function. The number of 
efficiency units of labour supplied by the population is: 
       
    
   
      
    
   
            
   
     1        
   
       (14) 
where    
  is the fraction of time used by genotype i for labour: 
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            (15) 
Equation (15) reflects the growing allocation of time to child rearing when potential 
income increases. When income reaches the critical value  ̃, the fraction of time used 
for child rearing reaches a maximum of γ, leaving the fraction (1- for labour.  
Using equations (14) and (15), the aggregate labour supply is: 
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4.  Response curves 
Despite each genotype having a fixed preference for quality, this does not result in a 
fixed level of investment in education over time as the return to education changes with 
the rate of technological progress. However, the agents’ education response curve to the 
rate of technological progress is fixed. Figure 1 shows how much time each genotype 
invests into education at a given level of technological progress, with the 
quality-preferring genotype a investing more in education at all rates of technological 
progress. The shape of the response curves is based on simulations of the model in 
section 8.
7 The inequality (11) guarantees that quality-preferring genotype a parents 
always choose a positive level of education for their children. 
Figure 1: Education response curves 
 
The fitness of a genotype depends on the number of offspring, which determines its 
prevalence in the population over time. Which genotype has more children in turn 
depends on the level of technology and economic growth. In the Malthusian state, the 
                                                 
7 The slope of the education response curve can be derived by applying the implicit function rule to 
equation (10). Using    ,           
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  The education response curve slopes upward if:                
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The higher fitness of the quality-preferring genotype in the Malthusian state and the 
quantity-preferring type in the modern growth state is akin to the classical r/K selection 
theory in evolutionary biology. Individuals that use the r strategy produce many 
offspring, each of which has a low probability of surviving to adulthood, while K 
strategists produce fewer offspring in which they invest more heavily, giving them a 
higher probability of surviving to adulthood.
8 r strategists exploit less crowded 
ecological niches, while K strategists are favoured in more crowded environments. This 
behaviour occurs in the Galor and Moav model. In the Malthusian state, where 
resources are scarce and the economy is effectively crowded, the quality-preferring 
genotype has higher fitness. In the modern growth regime, the economy has become 
uncrowded, giving higher fitness to the quantity-preferring genotype. 
The education and fertility response functions in Figures 1 and 2 allow limited 
phenotypic plasticity in the form of varying the level of education in response to 
technological progress. However, there is no flexibility in other dimensions. In 
particular, there is no fine-tuning of the response to economic growth to optimise 
fitness. In the modern growth era, quality-preferring parents engage in a self-defeating 
strategy of overeducating their children that affects their fitness. Additional flexibility in 
the education response could materially affect model predictions. 
 
5.  Functional forms 
To simulate the model, functional forms for     
   and gt+1 are needed. The following 
function for     
   matches most of the requirements given in equation (6): 
    
            
  ,         
       
            
     (17) 
This function does not fulfil the condition that heg > 0 for all values of     
   and gt+1, but 
this is only a sufficient and not a necessary condition. Simulating the model of Galor 
and Weil, Lagerlof (2004) uses a similar functional form, with m = r = 1. Defining 
a = ρτ ; ρ ∈ (0,1), Lagerlof interpreted the parameter ρ as the portion of fixed time cost 
                                                 
8 In relation to other species, human reproductive strategy of even the quantity-preferring type would be 
described as strongly K. There is considerable debate in the literature as to the appropriateness of 
applying r/K selection theory within the human species (for example, see Graves (2002)). 11 
 
of childrearing that contributes towards the development of the base level of human 
capital. 
The parameter m is included in equation (17) to allow the condition in equation (11) to 
be met. Using Lagerlof’s definition of a = ρτ, m must be bigger than 1. 
  
 
   1   1         ( 1 8 )  
This condition ensures that a quality-preferring genotype with β
a = 1 will invest in 
education when there is no economic growth. The parameter r is selected produce 
modern rates of education and economic growth.
9 
 A simple functional form for equation (13) is the power function: 
           
 ;  0<d<1;    k>0       (19) 
Using equations (10) and (17), the level of education that each genotype gives to its 
children is: 
    
   m a x 	   	 0 ,
1
2 
        1                        1       
        1                     1   
 
 4                                   
≡                      (20) 
This equation indicates that education in period t+1 is a function of the rate of 
technological progress in period t+1, which in turn is a function of the average level of 
education in period t. This link between education in one period and the next is crucial 
for the transition out of the Malthusian state. 
 
                                                 
9 The parameter a could also be used for this purpose, but reducing a tends to increase perturbations and 
increase the instability of the model. 12 
 
6.  The dynamical system 
The dynamics of the system can be captured in a system of six difference equations that 
describe the behaviour of the endogenous variables At, gt,   
 ,   
 ,   
 	and   
 . Before 
defining these equations,   
  and   
  must be expressed in terms of the endogenous 
variables.  
Collecting equations (2), (4), (16) and (17), potential income per worker equals:  
  
        
     





   
   
  
       
       (21) 
As Ht is a function of	  
 , equation (21) needs to be solved by iteration. The relationship 
between Ht and 	  
  magnifies population perturbations during the Malthusian era.
10 The 
model is modified at this stage in order to avoid extinctions. In the modified model, 
agents apply all of their time to labour and they decide on how to apportion the income 
from that labour between consumption and childrearing. Accordingly, equation (16) 
changes to: 
            
     1       
         ( 2 2 )  
This modification does not qualitatively change the simulations but does dampen 
population perturbations, allowing for a more stable model that is less prone to 
extinctions of the agents. 
Equation (21) becomes: 
  
        
    
   
       
          
   
 
 
   
   
  
       
      (23) 
Equations (9), (19) and (22) yield the number of children:  
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10 The perturbations increase when income is between c   and  ̃. In this situation, the parent is forced to 
reduce the proportion of time dedicated to childrearing, which further reduces fertility. 13 
 
The dynamical system for the six endogenous variables is: 
        1           
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7.  Parameter values 
Table 1 lists the numerical values given to each parameter for the base case model. The 
preference parameter of the quality-preferring genotype, 
a, is set equal to 1. The 
preference parameter of the quantity-preferring type, 
b, must be high enough to allow 
for an exit from the Malthusian state. For any value of 
b below 0.842, the economy 
remains in the Malthusian state because technological progress never reaches a level 
high enough to induce the quantity-preferring genotype to invest in education. 
b = 0.85 
is chosen because it produces a realistic level of education in the modern growth era. 
Table 1: Parameter values 
   Description  Value 
Parameters 
 
1 ∝  Labour share  0.6 
   Weight on children in utility function  0.209 
   Fixed time cost of children  0.15 
    Preference for quality of genotype a 1 
    Preference for quality of genotype b 0.85 
   Weighting of education in production of human capital  2 
   Portion of fixed cost time of raising child towards human capital  0.99*  
   Land 1 
 ̃  Subsistence consumption constraint  1 
   Growth function parameter  8.88 
d  Growth function parameter  0.5 




   Initial population of genotype a 0.001 
  
   Initial population of genotype b 0.665 
  
   Initial education of genotype a 0 
  
   Initial education of genotype b 0 
    Initial technology  1 
    Initial rate of technological progress  0 14 
 
Clark (2010) provides estimates of the labour share in national income, 1-, from the 
Middle Ages to modern times. The labour share increased from a low of 0.478 in the 
thirteenth century to above 0.6 in the early nineteenth century and to over 0.75 in the 
late twentieth century. We use a mid-point value of 0.6 for the labour share in income.  
The severity of population perturbations in the Malthusian state and during the 
transition limits the range of values for the fixed time cost of children. We choose 
  = 0.15 as at any lower value the perturbations tend to send the population extinct.
11 
An estimate for education expenditure, e, in the high-growth regime can be derived 
from OECD statistics. In 2009, education expenditures averaged 5.8 per cent of GDP 
across OECD countries (OECD 2009 Table B.2.4). The model is calibrated in a way to 
obtain an education level of genotype   individuals of 0.059, which is the OECD 
estimate for the United Kingdom. Given the predominance of genotype b, this is also 
the population average education in the modern growth regime. 
The parameter , which is the same for both genotypes, determines the relative weight 
of children in the utility function. As modern fertility in developed countries is generally 
below replacement,  is set to achieve zero population growth in the high-growth era, 
i.e. each parent has a single child.  Setting  = 0.209 and using the earlier values for  
and e yields n = /(+e) =0.209/(0.15 + 0.059) = 1. 
Income per worker grew 2.3 per cent per year in the United Kingdom from 1950 to 
2008 (Average annual growth 1960-2008 in Clark (2010), Table 33). Assuming 
20 years per generation and using continuous compounding, technological progress g 
equals 2.16 in the modern growth era.
12 With this g value and letting    0.5,  =8.88 in 
equation (19). 
Setting a in equation (17) far below 1 or m much above that required by equation (18) 
tends to increase population perturbations, so we set a = 0.99*τ and m = 2, satisfying 
inequality (18) and minimising perturbations. r = 0.151 yields the chosen equilibrium 
values of education and economic growth in the modern growth era. 
                                                 
11 This value is in the range of the estimate of expenditure on children as a proportion of GDP made by 
Haveman and Wolfe (1995), although Haveman and Wolfe’s calculation included education expenditure, 
which is separate from τ in the model. 
12  ∗   
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     1  
 
 .   ∗  
 .     1  15 
 
Finally, initial values must be chosen. The initial education is zero and hence initial 
economic growth is zero. Initial technology, A, and land, X, are set equal to 1. At time 
zero, the number of genotype a and b individuals is assumed to be   
 =0.001 and 
  
 =0.665. This is close to the equilibrium population in the first period. Using 
equation (21), the level of income in the first period is approximately 1.18, which is 
above subsistence but such that the subsistence constraint still binds (as it is below 
 ̃ = 1/(1-γ) = 1.26). 
 
8.  Simulation results 
The model explains the transition from Malthusian stagnation to modern economic 
growth, which occurred during the Industrial Revolution in the late 18
th and early 
19
th centuries. Initiating the simulation shortly before the beginning of the second 
millennium, the take-off occurs after about 45 generations or 900 years. The length of 
time to the take-off depends on the initial proportion of genotype a and b individuals. 
The transition phase from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth lasts about six 
generations or 120 years. In that interval, the rate of technological progress surges from 
1 per cent per annum to 5.7 per cent and income growth rises to the modern growth rate 
of 2.3 per cent per annum. Population growth increases until the time of the take-off, at 
which time it drops to zero during the transition phase. Figure 3 displays the behaviour of 
the annual growth rates of technology, income and population, and Figure 4 shows the 
log-levels of these variables.  
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invest more in education also have higher fertility due to their own higher quality and 
income. 
From the beginning of the transition out of the Malthusian state, genotype a parents 
have better educated children, but fewer of them, while genotype b parents have more 
children with less education. From this point, the quantity-quality trade-off can be 
observed at the population level. 
Several studies have found evidence for the quantity-quality trade-off in the modern 
growth era (see Shultz (2008) for some examples). Most population level studies report 
a negative correlation between quantity and quality of offspring. However, as is the case 
of this model, whether there appears to be a trade-off at the population level is not 
determinative of whether an individual faces that trade-off. To assess whether there is 
an individual trade-off, a number of studies have examined the effect of exogenous 
events such as twins or the sex composition of births. As is noted by Schultz, these 
exogenous shocks to quantity tend to have a smaller effect on child quality at the 
individual level than is observed at the population level, suggesting that some of the 
quantity-quality relationship observed at the population level may not be a direct 
quantity-quality trade-off but rather a reflection of other relationships. 
Only a few studies on the quantity-quality trade-off utilise data around the time of or 
before the Industrial Revolution. Becker et al. (2010) found a quantity-quality trade-off 
analysing population data from 334 Prussian counties in 1849. Becker et al. suggest that 
the early date of these findings is consistent with the Galor and Moav model in which 
the quantity-quality trade-off is present before the period of modern economic growth. 
This may not be the case, however, as in the Galor and Moav model there is no 
quantity-quality trade-off apparent at the population level during the Malthusian state. 
One source of pre-industrial data is from wills in England, as detailed in Clark and 
Hamilton (2006), Clark (2007) and Clark and Cummins (2009a, 2009b). From an 
examination of English wills dated 1585 to 1638, Clark and Hamilton found that wealth 
was strongly (and positively) predictive of reproductive success. The positive 
association between income and fertility in the Malthusian state is consistent with the 
Galor and Moav model. 
A paper by Clark and Cummins (2009a) presents some evidence on the trade-off at the 
individual level. While preliminary results, Clark and Cummins found that before 1780 19 
 
there was a significant (but modest) negative relationship between family size and the 
wealth of sons.
13 This suggests that a quantity-quality trade-off had been present before 
the Industrial Revolution. For the period 1780 to 1890, there was also a negative 
trade-off, although it may be of a smaller (or even negligible magnitude). 
Clark and Cummins note that this result potentially requires a revision of the theoretical 
basis of the Galor and Moav model. As the Galor and Moav model economy transitions 
out of the Malthusian state, the trade-off between quantity and quality increases, with 
the higher level of technological progress in the modern growth state increasing the 
returns (in the form of human capital) to education. The absence of an increasing 
trade-off in the empirical data may suggest that other factors are relevant, such as a 
direct genetic transfer of quality between generations.
14 
Another empirical issue with the Galor and Moav model is the population dynamics. 
The decline in the fertility of the quality-preferring genotype during the transition out of 
the Malthusian state is consistent with the early decline in fertility among the wealthy, 
which Clark and Cummins (2009b, 2010) documented. However, the Galor and Moav 
model predicts that the population will stabilise during the transition phase, which is too 
early. High rates of population growth persisted in Great Britain and other industrial 
countries to the end of the 19
th century. This presents an issue for the Galor and Moav 
model and other models that incorporate a quantity-quality trade-off. If an increase in 
child quality is expected to drive the transition to a modern growth state, a 




                                                 
13 Clark and Cummins are assembling a larger data set that will improve the robustness of the results and 
allow for additional controls to be included such as birth order and gender composition of siblings. 
14 Clark (2005) also suggested that there was no evidence of a market premium for skills that would 
provide a signal to parents to invest in the human capital of their children. 
15 Clark and Cummins (2009a) tested the hypothesis that changes in child mortality were responsible for 
the delayed demographic transition. They found that this hypothesis was not supported by the data. 20 
 
9.  Population perturbations in the Malthusian state 
The simulation of the Galor and Moav model produces population cycles during the 
Malthusian state. Considering the Galor and Weil model, Lagerlof (2006) explained the 
endogenous cycles as follows: 
“When population in the current period is large, land per agent is low, and per capita income 
close to subsistence. Thus fertility is close to zero and population in the next period pushed 
almost to extinction. This makes next period’s per capita incomes high, spurring a phase of 
population growth until overpopulation sets in and the cycle starts all over again.” 
We can make some further observations about these population cycles. First, the cycles 
are irregular perturbations that do not settle into a clear pattern. Second, they are highly 
dependent on the initial conditions. As shown by May (1976), a first-order difference 
equation can produce a large array of behaviours from stable points to apparently 
random cycles within a single functional form. In this section, it is shown that 
population growth in the Malthusian era is defined by a first order difference equation 
and that the pre-industrial population cycles hinge on the fixed time cost of childrearing. 
In the early Malthusian state, the quantity-preferring genotype b dominates the 
population. Genotype b adults do not educate their children, resulting in a population of: 
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If  ̃     
     ̃, as would be the case during the Malthusian era, and setting  ̃,   ,	and X 
equal to 1, the population equation simplifies to: 
      
1
     1    
          ( 2 6 )  
Setting L* = Lt = Lt+1, the equilibrium for the population is  ∗    1        ⁄ . The 
equilibrium is unstable if           ⁄   |1|. Taking the derivative of equation (26) 
yields: 
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If less than 100 iterations are performed, the population may survive for some starting 
values below 0.17, suggesting that the population may not become extinct if the take-off 
out of Malthusian state occurs early enough. In the models explored in this paper, the 
slight technological progress due to the presence of genotype   also increases the 
probability of survival for some starting values. 
 
10. Model extension – mutation and migration 
Galor and Moav did not use their model to consider the possibility of the evolution of 
new genotypes with different preferences over quality and quantity of children. As there 
is no mutation or migration, the genetic makeup of the population alters only because 
the prevalence of each genotype changes over time. While this is immaterial for the 
short transition phase out of the Malthusian state, it is relevant for the Malthusian era 
before the emergence of modern economic growth and it matters for the stability of the 
modern growth era. In this section, we show that the number of genotypes affects the 
predictions of the Galor and Moav model. The main finding is that a growing economy 
may regress to Malthusian conditions if a third genotype emerges that values education 
less than the other two. 
Using the same utility function as before, the quantity-quality preference parameters for 
the three genotypes are: β
a = 1.0, β
b = 0.85 and β
c = 0.7. All other parameters of the 
model are the same as in Table 1, except the initial levels of the subpopulations, which 
are   
     .   ,   
     .    and   
     .      . Thus, both the quality-preferring 
genotype a and the new strongly quantity-preferring genotype c are minute minorities at 
the beginning of the simulation, which may have emerged through mutation or 
migration.  
Figure 9 shows that the first 60 generations of the simulation are similar to the baseline 
simulation in Section 8. The transition out of the Malthusian state occurs quite quickly 
within six generations after the 45
th generation. Population growth again peaks early 
during the transition phase and the population stabilizes. Then, a growth era with high 
technological progress and income growth begins. However, in the model with three 
genotypes, the growth era lasts for only about 20 generations, or 400 years. Economic 
growth abates because there is a renewed increase in population after about generation 
75, which does not occur in the model with two genotypes. By generation 105, 23 
 
technological progress has ended and income growth is negative. The fall in per capita 
income continues until it has returned to the initial Malthusian level by about 
generation 260. Since technological progress is permanent, the economy supports a 
much higher population during the second Malthusian era. Figure 9 displays the growth 
rates of technology, population and income, and Figure 10 shows the level of these 
variables.  
Figure 9: Annual growth rate of technology, population and income 
 
Figure 10: Level of technology, population and income 
 
Figures 11, 12 and 13 reveal the behaviour of education, fertility and the genetic 
makeup of the population. In the initial Malthusian state, genotype a has the highest 
fitness as education increases potential income, and genotypes b and c have equal 


















































































































































selection favours genotype c because the other two genotypes overeducate their 
children. The return to the Malthusian state is caused by a decline in per capita human 
capital, which is driven by the higher fertility of genotype c and its increasing 
prevalence in the population. Since genotype c does not invest in education, the average 
education level of the population declines and technological progress stalls. After the 
return to Malthusian conditions, the bulk of the population is genotype c, with a small 
proportion of genotype b and genotype a almost driven to extinction. 
Figure 11: Education 
 





















































Figure 13: Proportion of population of each genotype 
 
Figures 14, 15 and 16 display the dynamics of the economy after the return to 
Malthusian conditions. At first, genotype a regains the fitness advantage and again starts 
to increase in proportion of the population. It takes several hundred generations for 
genotype a to recover to meaningful numbers from their near extinction at the beginning 
of the second Malthusian state. The renewed increase in the prevalence of genotype a 
again promotes technological progress, but it is not sufficient for another exit from 
Malthusian stagnation. The second Malthusian state is permanent because technological 
progress is matched by population growth. Thus, the situation is different from the 
initial Malthusian state where a small number of genotype c individuals emerged 
through mutation or migration. In the second Malthusian state, there is a high proportion 
of genotype c whose fertility absorbs any increase in income. After generation 675, a 
growth cycle repeats itself about every 25 years without ever leading out of Malthusian 
stagnation. The cycles are generated by the interaction between genotype a, which 
drives technological progress, and genotype c, whose high fertility dilutes the average 










































Figure 14: Proportion of population of each genotype 
 


































































Figure 16: Level of technology, population and income 
 
The simulation of the extended Galor and Moav model that is presented in this section 
is compatible with a number of scenarios. It is indicative of a case where a third 
genotype c emerges through mutation or migration in a situation with two genotypes 
during the Malthusian era, or alternatively, after the exit of the initial Malthusian era. In 
each case, the simulation begins with a small minority of genotype a and c individuals. 
Eventually, the genotype c individuals will dominate the population and drive the 
economy back into Malthusian conditions.  
 
11. Conclusion 
The simulation of the Galor and Moav model results in a pattern of income and 
population growth that resembles the period of Malthusian stagnation and the take-off 
into a modern growth era. However, the timing of the demographic transition concurrent 
with the commencement of income growth is not consistent with empirical evidence 
that the demographic transition occurred several generations after the initial take-off. 
This highlights issues with the quantity-quality trade-off mechanism that underlies the 
model and suggests that alternative or additional factors should be considered. 
The simulation has also demonstrated that the model is heavily dependent on the 
selection of parameters, with minor variations in preference for quality or the resource 
cost per child substantially modifying the model outcomes. One area of fragility is the 




























































simulation of the Galor and Weil (2000) model. The present paper identifies the first 
order difference equation that determines the population dynamics as the cause of the 
oscillations and describes how the time cost of children variable influences their nature. 
The instability of the model also extends to the biological features. If the model includes 
more than the two genotypes with fixed preferences between quantity and quality, the 
modern growth state is not stable and is susceptible to invasion by a strongly quantity-
preferring genotype. This can return the population to the Malthusian state and in the 
case of the scenario examined, the final Malthusian state is permanent. 
The simulation exercise highlights a number of possible further considerations relevant 
to a biological evolution theory of the Industrial Revolution. Consideration could be 
given to the individuals having a higher degree of phenotypic plasticity, in that they 
have some flexibility in their response to technological progress. This could allow 
quality-preferring types to reduce their response to technological progress where it is 
clear that fertility was being substantially hampered by their over-investment in 
education. Phenotypic plasticity could add some robustness to the modern-growth state 
by allowing quality-preferring types to maintain a share of the total population. 
However, in the Galor and Moav model as presented above, a genotype that does not 
invest in education when income is above subsistence will always have a fitness 
advantage and drive the model back towards the Malthusian state. 
Furthermore, the introduction of stochastic mutation or migration would enable 
examination of a richer biological environment. This may require the use of an 
agent-based model. The introduction of an agent-based model (possibly incorporating 
overlapping generations) may also allow moderation of the perturbations in the 
Malthusian state without requiring the use of implausible or arbitrary parameters. 
  29 
 
References 
Ashraf, Q. & Galor, O., 2010. The “Out of Africa” Hypothesis, Human Genetic 
Diversity, and Comparative Economic Development. Available at: 
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2010/2010-7_paper.pdf. 
Becker, G.S., 1976. Altruism, Egoism and Genetic Fitness: Economics and 
Sociobiology. Journal of Economic Literature, 14, pp.817-826. 
Becker, G.S., 1960. An Economic Analysis of Fertility. In Universities National Bureau, 
eds. Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries. Princeton: 
UMI, pp. 225-256. Available at: http://www.nber.org/books/univ60-2 [Accessed 
December 5, 2010]. 
Becker, G.S. & Lewis, H.G., 1974. Interaction between Quantity and Quality of 
Children. In T. W. Schultz, ed. Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, 
and Human Capital. UMI, pp. 81-90. Available at: 
http://www.nber.org/books/schu74-1 [Accessed December 5, 2010]. 
Becker, G.S., Murphy, K.M. & Tamura, R., 1990. Human Capital, Fertility and 
Economic Growth. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), p.S12-S37. 
Becker, S.O., Cinnirella, F. & Woessmann, L., 2010. The trade-off between fertility and 
education: evidence from before the demographic transition. Journal of 
Economic Growth, 15(3), pp.177-204. 
Cavalli-Sforza, L.L., Menozzi, P. & Piazza, A., 1994. The History and Geography of 
Human Genes, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Clark, G., 2007. A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World, Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Clark, G., 2005. The Condition of the Working Class in England, 1209–2004. Journal 
of Political Economy, 113(6), pp.1307-1340. 
Clark, G., 2010. The macroeconomic aggregates for England, 1209–2008. In Research 
in Economic History. Research in Economic History. Bingley: Emerald Group 
Publishing, pp. 51-140. 
Clark, G. & Cummins, N., 2010. Malthus to Modernity: England’s First Fertility 
Transition, 1760-1800. Available at: 
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/papers/Demographic%20Transition
%202010.pdf [Accessed December 18, 2010]. 
Clark, G. & Cummins, N., 2009a. The Origins of Modern Growth: Fertility and Human 
Capital in England, 1500-1914. In University Seminar in Economic History. 
Columbia University. Available at: 
http://www.econ.barnard.columbia.edu/~econhist/papers/Clark_Cummins_Nov2
009.pdf. 
Clark, G. & Cummins, N., 2009b. Urbanization, Mortality, and Fertility in Malthusian 
England. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 99(2), pp.242-
247. 30 
 
Clark, G. & Hamilton, G., 2006. Survival of the Richest: The Malthusian Mechanism in 
Pre-Industrial England. Journal of Economic History, 66(3), pp.707-736. 
Darwin, C., 1859. On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, London: 
John Murray, Albemarle Street. 
Galor, O. & Michalopoulos, S., 2011. Evolution and the Growth Process: Natural 
Selection of Entrepreneurial Traits. Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming. 
Available at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/bro/econwp/2011-9.html. 
Galor, O. & Moav, O., 2002. Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic Growth. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), pp.1133-1191. 
Galor, O. & Weil, D.N., 2000. Population, Technology, and Growth: From Malthusian 
Stagnation to the Demographic Transition and Beyond. American Economic 
Review, 90(4), pp.806-828. 
Graves, J.L., 2002. What a tangled web he weaves. Anthropological Theory, 2(2), 
pp.131 -154. 
Hansson, I. & Stuart, C., 1990. Malthusian Selection of Preferences. American 
Economic Review, 80(3), pp.529-544. 
Haveman, R. & Wolfe, B., 1995. The Determinants of Children’s Attainments: A 
Review of Methods and Findings. Journal of Economic Literature, 33(4), 
pp.1829-1878. 
Hirshleifer, J., 1977. Economics from a Biological Viewpoint. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 20(1), pp.1-52. 
Lagerlöf, N.-P., 2006. The Galor-Weil model revisited: A quantitative exercise. Review 
of Economic Dynamics, 9(1), pp.116-142. 
May, R.M., 1976. Simple mathematical models with very complicated dynamics. 
Nature, 261, p.459. 
Nelson, R.R. & Winter, S.G., 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Netzer, N., 2009. Evolution of Time Preferences and Attitudes toward Risk. American 
Economic Review, 99(3), pp.937-955. 




R Development Core Team, 2010. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical 
Computing, Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing. Available 
at: http://www.r-project.org. 
Robson, A.J. & Samuelson, L., 2007. The Evolution of Intertemporal Preferences. 
American Economic Review, 97(2), pp.496-500. 31 
 
Robson, A.J. & Szentes, B., 2008. Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection: 
Comment. American Economic Review, 98(3), pp.1178-1188. 
Rogers, A.R., 1994. Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection. American 
Economic Review, 83(3), pp.460-481. 
Rubin, P.H. & Paul II, C.W., 1979. An Evolutionary Model of Taste for Risk. Economic 
Inquiry, 17(4), pp.585-596. 
Schultz, T.P., 2008. Population Policies, Fertility, Women’s Human Capital, and Child 
Quality. In T. P. Schultz & J. Strauss, eds. Hanbook of Development Economics. 
Handbooks in Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V., p. 3249. 
Spolaore, E. & Wacziarg, R., 2009. The Diffusion of Development. Quarterly Journal 
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2010), a free language and environment for statistical computing. The software is 
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time<-200 #number of generations 
 
#Build data frame which will be used to store results 
Growth<-data.frame(time=0, A, g, ea, eb, La, Lb, na, nb, za, zb) 
 
#establish a loop 
































if(za<zc & za>sc) na<-(1-(sc/za))/(Tau+ea) 
if(za<=sc) na<-0 
if(zb>=zc) nb<-gamma/(Tau+eb) 
if(zb<zc & zb>sc) nb<-(1-(sc/zb))/(Tau+eb) 
if(zb<=sc) nb<-0 
 
#Bind the new generation of results to the data frame 














































#Build data frame which will be used to store results 
Growth<-data.frame(time=0, A, g, ea, eb, ec, La, Lb, Lc, na, nb, nc, 
za, zb, zc) 
 
#establish a loop 






































if(za<zsc & za>sc) na<-(1-(sc/za))/(Tau+ea) 
if(za<=sc) na<-0 
if(zb>=zsc) nb<-gamma/(Tau+eb) 
if(zb<zsc & zb>sc) nb<-(1-(sc/zb))/(Tau+eb) 
if(zb<=sc) nb<-0 
if(zc>=zsc) nc<-gamma/(Tau+ec) 
if(zc<zsc & zc>sc) nc<-(1-(sc/zc))/(Tau+ec) 
if(zc<=sc) nc<-0 
 
Growth<-rbind(Growth, c(t, A, g, ea, eb, ec, La, Lb, Lc, na, nb, nc, 
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